Bad luck or bad policy? by Vanessa Sumo





ars have often fueled 
inflation. Throughout his-
tory, printing money was 
a handy way for governments and
empires to fund war-related expenses
without raising taxes. However, with
too much money chasing too few
goods, price levels would then shoot
up. In 1970s America, though, wars
were not the stuff that fueled infla-
tion. Indeed, economist Brad DeLong
of the University of California at
Berkeley calls the Great Inflation of
the 1970s, “America’s only peacetime
outburst of inflation.” 
No matter which measure is used,
inflation was high and volatile in the
late 1960s to the early 1980s. There
were three different inflation cycles
during this period, and each peak of
the cycle was higher than the last. 
By the first quarter of 1980, inflation
had risen more than 14 percent over
the previous year. However, after 
hitting that high point, inflation 
rapidly declined and has remained
remarkably low and stable over the last
two decades. How can we explain this
unmistakable shift?
It is tempting to assign blame or
praise to the members of the Federal
Reserve’s Open Market Committee,
who were at the helm of the central
bank during these various episodes.
Much credit, for instance, has been
given to Paul Volcker and Alan
Greenspan for driving down inflation
during their tenure. But couldn’t they
have also been lucky? Similarly, weren’t
Arthur Burns and G. William Miller
just hit by a string of bad luck? After
all, the twin oil shocks of the 1970s
must have had a devastating effect on
the economy. 
Whether the rise and fall of infla-
tion is thanks to luck or policy is an
important question because the
answer tells us to what extent mone-
tary policy matters for economic
stability or if we are simply helpless to
the vagaries of the business cycle. 
“Do we think that we’ve learned some
lessons from the 1960s and 1970s, so
that [the Fed] should keep doing what
they’ve been doing? Or do we think that
we just got lucky? If so, that doesn’t tell
us much about future Federal Reserve
policy,” says Mark Watson, an econo-
mist at Princeton University and a
visiting scholar at the Richmond Fed.
The answer is far from settled, but it
could be a good measure of both.
Policy Mistakes and Triumphs 
The story that policy rather than luck
is responsible for the rise and fall of
inflation is, according to Chicago Fed
economist Francois Velde, “an opti-
mistic story that relies on errors made
and lessons well learned.” Learning
from policy mistakes of the past is a
crucial point for this view because it
provides a reason why policymakers
engineered a decisive break in their
response to inflation in the early 1980s. 
The story begins with the memory
of the Great Depression of the 1930s.
DeLong believes that “the truest
cause” of the 1970s inflation was the
shadow cast decades later by this
extraordinary economic downturn.
The Great Depression may have led to
the Great Inflation because that event
cultivated a strong aversion to unem-
ployment, convincing policymakers
that any level of unemployment was
too high. 
At the same time, work by some of
the best economists of the 1960s 
reassured policymakers that lower
unemployment could be successfully
purchased by allowing only moderate
increases in inflation. For instance,
estimates by Nobel Prize winners
Robert Solow and Paul Samuelson of
the trade-off between inflation and
unemployment for the United States
(the Phillips Curve) suggested that a
modest 4.5 percent increase in prices
each year would be enough to bring
down the unemployment rate from 
5.5 percent to 3 percent. 
Against this backdrop, the Fed,
under William McChesney Martin Jr.,
proceeded with what it thought 
would be a successful experiment of 
stimulating the economy through
expansionary monetary policy without
accelerating inflation. But as Velde
notes, unemployment indeed fell by
1969 — but to only about 4 percent
and at a high price tag of 6 percent
inflation, not exactly the terms that it
had bargained for. 
By the time the 1970s rolled in and
Burns was appointed as the new head
of the Fed, inflation had started to
escalate to worrying levels. At this
point, it was becoming clear that the
trade-off promised by the Phillips
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Once people came to anticipate more
inflation, any surprise expansionary
attempts by the Fed would only result
in higher inflation but without a 
substantial decrease in unemployment
below its “natural rate.” However, 
neither Burns nor the political leader-
ship at that time were willing to lower
inflation for fear of the extremely 
high cost it would entail in terms of
the loss of jobs. 
The triumphant moment arrived
when Paul Volcker took control of the
Federal Reserve at the end of the
decade, armed not only with the 
political mandate to purge inflation
but also with a bagful of hard lessons
from policy mistakes committed in
the recent past. An important lesson
learned was that people form their
expectations about inflation based on
how they anticipate policymakers 
will react to it. In fact, policymakers 
themselves could alter the terms of the
trade-off between inflation and unem-
ployment. For instance, because
people are well aware of policymakers’
temptation to stimulate the economy
with surprise inflation, central bankers
must find a credible way to resist this
temptation in order to effectively
carry out monetary policy.
But how can we assert that the rise
and fall in inflation was indeed due to a
shift from bad to good policies, as
sketched in the story above? Two 
studies, one by Richard Clarida 
of Columbia University, Jordi Gali 
of Pompeu Fabra University in
Barcelona, and Mark Gertler of New
York University, and another one writ-
ten more recently by Richmond Fed
economist Thomas Lubik and Frank
Schorfheide of the University of
Pennsylvania, look for evidence that
policy has changed over the relevant
period in a way that explains the 
dramatic movement in inflation.
Both papers look at the responsive-
ness of the Fed’s interest rate policy 
to changes in inflation during the 
pre-Volcker period on the one hand
and the Volcker and Greenspan period
on the other. The idea is as 
follows. Central bank behavior is 
captured well by a policy rule by
which the Fed sets the federal funds
rate, its monetary policy instrument,
in response to deviations of current or
expected inflation and output from
some desired level. If the Fed wishes 
to successfully bring down inflation, 
a helpful measure would be to raise 
the fed funds rate by more than the
increase in inflation, such that the 
real short-term rate rises and real
spending falls. But if the fed funds 
rate changes by only a fraction of 
the change in anticipated inflation,
then the Fed will effectively stimulate
the economy through lower real short-
term rates, which leads to further rises
in inflation. 
Such a policy that accommodates
inflation, or a passive interest rate 
policy, is particularly bad because it
not only prevents the Fed from 
stabilizing inflation, but it also can
actually turn monetary policy into a
source of economic instability. This
can happen because passive policy
leaves open the possibility that the
economy be subjected to “sunspot”
shocks, which are unrelated to eco-
nomic fundamentals but matter
anyway because people think they do. 
For instance, sunspot fluctuations
can occur when individuals correctly
anticipate that the Fed will react too
feebly to an inflationary shock. This
anticipation is then built into future
inflation, to which real interest rates
decline, and the initial expectations
are validated. Because of this, inflation
can wander off the path it would 
otherwise follow. The same fate holds
for fundamental shocks, such as 
productivity shocks, that hit the 
economy. Under a passive policy
regime these can affect the economy
in unpredictable ways. Thus, if a good
or active policy is not in place, mone-
tary policy itself could potentially 
lead to the type of volatile macroeco-
nomic outcomes that we witnessed
back in the 1970s. The work of
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, as well as
that of Lubik and Schorfheide largely
confirm this story. 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler were
probably the first to “add precision 
to the conventional wisdom” that
monetary policy was relatively well
managed during the time of Volcker
and Greenspan but much less so 15
years prior to Volcker. They confirm
their suspicions that monetary policy
was passive during the pre-Volcker
period, whereas they find that during 
the Volcker and Greenspan era, the
nominal interest rate was almost three
times more sensitive to changes in
expected inflation. “[Not] until Volcker
took office did controlling inflation
become the organizing focus of mone-
tary policy,” wrote Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler. Hence, good policy had saved
the day.
Lubik and Schorfheide revisit the
findings of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler,
and add even more precision to 
the latter’s work by devising a more
sophisticated method to estimate the
dynamics of the economy. Their esti-
mation results likewise allow them to
ascertain whether there was a shift
from bad to good policy by looking at
the responsiveness of the nominal
interest rate to inflation during the
pre-Volcker and post-1982 periods.
Like Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, they
find that after the Volcker policy shift,
monetary policy was much more
aggressive in fighting inflation than in
the 1970s. In addition, their method
allows them to be more precise about
the role of sunspot shocks and funda-
mental shocks during the period of
passive policy, which had opened the
door to erratic and undesirable paths
of inflation and output in the 1970s. 
These papers have prompted many
responses, particularly to explain why
rational policymakers would choose to
follow the inferior policy that they did
in the 1960s and 1970s. In the response
offered by Giorgio Primiceri of
Northwestern University, rational 
policymakers form their rules based
on what they believe is optimal at that
time, given the information they
observe and what they know about
how the economy works. In other
words, policymakers were simply
doing the best they could. “Alan
Greenspan in the 1960s would have
behaved very similarly to the chairman
?
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the 1960s would not have known what
he knows now,” says Primiceri.
One reason why episodes of high
inflation can occur is if policymakers
believe that the natural rate of unem-
ployment is lower than it actually is.
Their policies would then tend to be
too expansionary, thus leading to 
higher inflation. However, this is not
enough to explain why rational policy-
makers would let inflation remain high
for such a long time. According to
Primiceri, policymakers in the 1960s
were under the spell of overoptimism,
a condition that was encouraged by
looking at the turbulent inflation data
from the 1950s, which offered the false
hope that inflation was quickly “mean
reverting.” Because they observed that
inflation was moving up and down,
they were convinced that if inflation
went up, it would not be long before it
would come back down again. 
But what prolonged the rise in
inflation was when this overoptimism
turned into overpessimism in the
1970s. Policymakers thought that the
sacrifice ratio, or the cost of bringing
down inflation in terms of unemploy-
ment, was going to be very high. For
example, in a 1978 article, Arthur
Okun computed the sacrifice ratio
based on the estimated trade-off
between inflation and unemployment
in the literature at that time to be at 10
to one. That is, in order to bring 
inflation down by 1 percent, GDP
must contract by 10 percent, a very
painful proposition. Things started to
change only in the beginning of the
1980s, when the cost of inflation was
finally deemed by all quarters as 
simply too high.
As Luck Would Have It
Not everyone believes in the opti-
mistic story of bad policy turned good.
For instance, the oil price shocks of
1973 and 1979 are considered one of
the prime suspects in the terrible 
inflation of the 1970s. In that case, 
it may have been bad luck rather 
than bad policy that was driving 
the surge and persistence in inflation.
But economists have at least three 
problems with this argument. First,
inflation was already building up prior
to each burst in oil prices, not the
other way around. Second, it is not
clear that these shocks affected wages,
something that would have left a last-
ing impact on the course of inflation.
Third, an oil price shock alone may
not be enough to set off a sustained
rise in inflation without the help of 
an expansionary monetary policy. 
Still, fewer and more manageable
shocks during the 1980s and beyond
have made this period a relatively
peaceful one. The decline in the
volatility of output growth, due to 
this dose of good fortune, may have
moderated inflation since the 1980s
and made a central banker’s job of
taming inflation much easier. Such
lucky shocks can come in the form of
smaller ones like the absence of oil
supply disruptions and the produc-
tivity resurgence of the 1990s, or more
permanent changes in the structure of
the economy. These include new ways
to manage inventory that have allowed
firms to smooth production, as well as
improvements in banking and finance
that have made it easier for consumers
and businesses to hedge risks and 
soften their liquidity constraints.
But instead of trying to pick out
what exact piece of bad or good luck
there is to blame or be thankful for,
more recent work has focused on 
analyzing how the volatility of such
shocks has changed over time. If the
rise and fall in inflation is indeed due
to a change in the economy’s fortunes,
and not because of a policy shift, then
the volatility of these shocks should
have diminished in the 1980s and
beyond. 
Indeed, Princeton University econ-
omist Christopher Sims and Tao Zha
of the Atlanta Fed find that, unlike the
conclusions of the policy camp, the
Fed’s monetary policy rule did not
change over time. Instead, what best
characterizes the rise and fall of 
inflation in their view is “stable mone-
tary policy reactions to a changing
array of major disturbances.” In other
words, the differences in the two
regimes can be traced to the change in
the volatility of the shocks affecting
these two periods. Sims and Zha point
to the oil price shocks and the financ-
ing of the Vietnam War in the 1960s
and 1970 as the source of this macro-
economic turmoil, and that shocks on
such a scale have not recurred since. 
On the surface, it is difficult to
square how different economists can
come to strikingly different conclu-
sions – one says that a change in policy
is responsible for the dramatic turn 
in inflation and the other says it is all
about luck. The divergence lies in the
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In the 1970s, the U.S. economy experienced significant shocks, such as sharp rises in energy prices in 1973 and 1979. At the same time, the
Federal Reserve pursued monetary policies that many considered unwise. Economists debate whether the high and erratic inflation of
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results. For instance, Primiceri has
two papers that argue in favor of each 
corner of the ring (although he says
that his “policy” explanation is his
favorite one). In his “luck” study, he
uses a statistical model that imposes
minimal assumptions and very little
structure, and so allows the data in its
most undisturbed form to weave its
own conclusion. He and others like
Sims and Zha who have used this
approach tend to find results in 
favor of the luck side. On the other
hand, those who take on more eco-
nomic assumptions in their model, 
for instance, on how policymakers
behave and make decisions, will tend
to lean toward the policy side.
Similarly, Lubik’s response to 
Sims and Zha’s conclusions is that
finding a change in the volatility 
of the underlying shocks to the 
economy can actually correspond 
to more than one economic structure
or to more than one view of how
shocks are transmitted throughout
the economy. Thus, we cannot be cer-
tain that the bad luck-good luck story
is the right explanation of what is
observed in the data.
ATable for Two
Lubik and Schorfheide are able to
measure the importance of sunspot
shocks and fundamental shocks as 
well as to observe how exactly these
disturbances could have led to the eco-
nomic turmoil under a passive policy
regime in the 1970s. They find that
although sunspot fluctuations can
explain a sizeable amount (about one-
third) of the volatility in inflation, 
they do not do a good job of explaining
the volatility in output growth. “It
leaves the door open for an alternative
explanation,” says Lubik, “that [output
growth volatility] may have been due
to bad luck.” 
Thus, luck may play a bigger role in
the dynamics of output growth. But if
the behavior of output somehow
affects inflation, then a bit of luck, not
just policy, will also find its way to
explaining the changes in prices. In
the 1980s and 1990s, monetary policy
was more aggressive, but at the same
time, real shocks such as the adoption
of information technology had a favor-
able impact on output growth and
inflation. Thus, the fall in inflation in
the last two decades could be
explained by a combination of a lot of
good policy and a bit of good luck
caused by stable output growth. 
“I would put 70 percent on good poli-
cy and 30 percent on good luck,” says
Lubik. 
Similarly, James Stock of Harvard
University and Mark Watson of
Princeton University find that 
monetary policy has played an 
important role in determining the
path of inflation, but doubt whether
it was instrumental for bringing
about that happy period of stable
output in the last two decades. “My
view is that the Fed gets to take full
credit for taming inflation; whether it
gets credit for taming the business
cycle is another question,” says
Watson. 
In theory, the causation can run the
other way. Monetary policy can ease
output growth volatility as it works on
inflation. But if at the same time the
shocks to the economy have become
smaller or if firms have become better
at smoothing shocks, then these spells
of good luck could be mostly responsi-
ble for the stability in output growth.
Stock and Watson think that this is
the story of the 1980s and beyond and
hence conclude that monetary policy
played, at best, a modest role in this
period of moderation in output
growth volatility.
Thus, there could be a role for both
luck and policy, with policy getting 
the edge for inflation and luck for 
output growth. However, most are in
agreement that the Fed should take
much recognition for restoring price
stability — and responsibility for
maintaining it.  RF
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